672 lines
22 KiB
JavaScript
672 lines
22 KiB
JavaScript
const { describe, it, beforeEach, afterEach, before, after } = require('mocha');
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const { expect } = require('chai');
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const sinon = require('sinon');
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const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
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const { setupTestEnvironment, teardownTestEnvironment, cleanDatabase, createTestUser, createTestTenant, createTestDevice, generateTestToken } = require('../setup');
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describe('Security Tests', () => {
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let models, sequelize;
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before(async () => {
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({ models, sequelize } = await setupTestEnvironment());
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});
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after(async () => {
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await teardownTestEnvironment();
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});
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beforeEach(async () => {
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await cleanDatabase();
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});
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describe('Authentication Security', () => {
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it('should prevent JWT token manipulation', async () => {
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const tenant = await createTestTenant();
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const user = await createTestUser({ tenant_id: tenant.id });
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const validToken = generateTestToken(user, tenant);
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const [header, payload, signature] = validToken.split('.');
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// Test various token manipulation attempts
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const manipulationTests = [
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{
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name: 'Modified payload',
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token: header + '.' + Buffer.from(JSON.stringify({
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...JSON.parse(Buffer.from(payload, 'base64').toString()),
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role: 'admin' // Attempt privilege escalation
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})).toString('base64') + '.' + signature
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},
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{
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name: 'Modified signature',
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token: header + '.' + payload + '.' + 'tampered_signature'
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},
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{
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name: 'Wrong algorithm',
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token: jwt.sign({
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userId: user.id,
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tenantId: tenant.id
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}, 'secret', { algorithm: 'HS256' }) // Different algorithm
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},
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{
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name: 'Expired token',
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token: jwt.sign({
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userId: user.id,
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tenantId: tenant.id,
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exp: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) - 3600 // Expired 1 hour ago
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}, process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'test-secret')
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}
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];
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for (const test of manipulationTests) {
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try {
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const decoded = jwt.verify(test.token, process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'test-secret');
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// If we get here, the token was accepted when it shouldn't be
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if (test.name === 'Wrong algorithm') {
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// This might be valid depending on configuration
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continue;
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}
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// Token should have been rejected but wasn't - this is unexpected
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throw new Error(`Token manipulation test "${test.name}" should have failed but was accepted`);
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} catch (error) {
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// Expected behavior - token should be rejected
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if (error.message && error.message.includes('should have failed but was accepted')) {
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throw error; // Re-throw unexpected success
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}
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expect(error.name).to.be.oneOf(['JsonWebTokenError', 'TokenExpiredError', 'NotBeforeError']);
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}
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}
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});
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it('should enforce tenant boundaries in JWT tokens', async () => {
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const tenant1 = await createTestTenant({ slug: 'tenant1' });
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const tenant2 = await createTestTenant({ slug: 'tenant2' });
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const user1 = await createTestUser({ tenant_id: tenant1.id });
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const user2 = await createTestUser({ tenant_id: tenant2.id });
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// Create device for tenant1
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const device1 = await createTestDevice({
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id: 111,
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tenant_id: tenant1.id,
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is_approved: true
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});
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// User from tenant2 tries to access tenant1's device
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const crossTenantToken = generateTestToken(user2, tenant2);
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// Simulate middleware that would check tenant access
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const checkTenantAccess = (token, targetTenantId) => {
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const decoded = jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'test-secret');
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return decoded.tenantId === targetTenantId;
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};
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const hasAccess = checkTenantAccess(crossTenantToken, tenant1.id);
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expect(hasAccess).to.be.false;
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// User from tenant1 should have access to their own tenant
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const validToken = generateTestToken(user1, tenant1);
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const hasValidAccess = checkTenantAccess(validToken, tenant1.id);
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expect(hasValidAccess).to.be.true;
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});
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it('should handle brute force login attempts', async () => {
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const tenant = await createTestTenant();
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const user = await createTestUser({
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tenant_id: tenant.id,
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username: 'brutetest',
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password: 'SecurePassword123!'
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});
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// Mock rate limiting storage
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const rateLimitStore = new Map();
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const checkRateLimit = (identifier, maxAttempts = 5, windowMs = 15 * 60 * 1000) => {
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const now = Date.now();
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const attempts = rateLimitStore.get(identifier) || { count: 0, resetTime: now + windowMs };
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if (now > attempts.resetTime) {
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// Reset window
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attempts.count = 0;
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attempts.resetTime = now + windowMs;
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}
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attempts.count++;
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rateLimitStore.set(identifier, attempts);
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return attempts.count <= maxAttempts;
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};
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// Simulate multiple failed login attempts
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for (let i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
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const allowed = checkRateLimit('brutetest');
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if (i < 5) {
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expect(allowed).to.be.true;
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} else {
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expect(allowed).to.be.false; // Should be blocked after 5 attempts
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}
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}
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});
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});
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describe('Authorization Security', () => {
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it('should prevent privilege escalation attempts', async () => {
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const tenant = await createTestTenant();
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const regularUser = await createTestUser({
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tenant_id: tenant.id,
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role: 'user'
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});
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const adminUser = await createTestUser({
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tenant_id: tenant.id,
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role: 'admin'
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});
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// Test role-based access control
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const checkPermission = (user, action) => {
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const permissions = {
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'user': ['view_detections', 'view_devices'],
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'admin': ['view_detections', 'view_devices', 'manage_devices', 'manage_users', 'view_system'],
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'system_admin': ['*'] // All permissions
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};
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const userPermissions = permissions[user.role] || [];
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return userPermissions.includes(action) || userPermissions.includes('*');
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};
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// Regular user should not have admin permissions
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expect(checkPermission(regularUser, 'manage_devices')).to.be.false;
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expect(checkPermission(regularUser, 'manage_users')).to.be.false;
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expect(checkPermission(regularUser, 'view_system')).to.be.false;
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// But should have basic permissions
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expect(checkPermission(regularUser, 'view_detections')).to.be.true;
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expect(checkPermission(regularUser, 'view_devices')).to.be.true;
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// Admin should have admin permissions
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expect(checkPermission(adminUser, 'manage_devices')).to.be.true;
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expect(checkPermission(adminUser, 'manage_users')).to.be.true;
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});
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it('should enforce IP address restrictions', async () => {
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const tenant = await createTestTenant({
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ip_restrictions: '192.168.1.0/24,10.0.0.0/8'
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});
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const checkIPRestriction = (clientIP, allowedRanges) => {
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if (!allowedRanges) return true;
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const isIPInRange = (ip, range) => {
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if (range.includes('/')) {
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// CIDR notation
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const [network, prefixLength] = range.split('/');
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const prefix = parseInt(prefixLength);
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// Simplified check for testing
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if (prefix === 24) {
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const networkPrefix = network.substring(0, network.lastIndexOf('.'));
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const ipPrefix = ip.substring(0, ip.lastIndexOf('.'));
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return networkPrefix === ipPrefix;
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}
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if (prefix === 8) {
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const networkPrefix = network.split('.')[0];
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const ipPrefix = ip.split('.')[0];
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return networkPrefix === ipPrefix;
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}
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}
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return ip === range;
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};
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const ranges = allowedRanges.split(',');
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return ranges.some(range => isIPInRange(clientIP, range.trim()));
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};
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const allowedIPs = [
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'192.168.1.100',
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'192.168.1.50',
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'10.0.0.15',
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'10.5.3.100'
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];
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const blockedIPs = [
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'203.0.113.1', // External IP
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'172.16.0.1', // Different private range
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'192.168.2.100' // Wrong subnet
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];
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allowedIPs.forEach(ip => {
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const result = checkIPRestriction(ip, tenant.ip_restrictions);
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console.log(`Testing allowed IP ${ip} against ${tenant.ip_restrictions}: ${result}`);
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expect(result).to.be.true;
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});
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blockedIPs.forEach(ip => {
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const result = checkIPRestriction(ip, tenant.ip_restrictions);
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console.log(`Testing blocked IP ${ip} against ${tenant.ip_restrictions}: ${result}`);
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expect(result).to.be.false;
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});
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});
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it('should prevent unauthorized data modification', async () => {
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const tenant1 = await createTestTenant();
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const tenant2 = await createTestTenant();
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const user1 = await createTestUser({ tenant_id: tenant1.id, role: 'admin' });
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const user2 = await createTestUser({ tenant_id: tenant2.id, role: 'admin' });
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const device1 = await createTestDevice({
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id: 123,
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tenant_id: tenant1.id
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});
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// User2 attempts to modify device belonging to tenant1
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const unauthorizedUpdate = async () => {
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return await models.Device.update(
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{ name: 'Hacked Device' },
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{
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where: {
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id: device1.id,
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tenant_id: user2.tenant_id // Wrong tenant
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}
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}
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);
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};
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const result = await unauthorizedUpdate();
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expect(result[0]).to.equal(0); // No rows affected
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// Verify device was not modified
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const device = await models.Device.findByPk(device1.id);
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expect(device.name).to.not.equal('Hacked Device');
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});
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});
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describe('Input Validation Security', () => {
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it('should prevent SQL injection attempts', async () => {
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const tenant = await createTestTenant();
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const device = await createTestDevice({ tenant_id: tenant.id });
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// SQL injection payloads
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const injectionPayloads = [
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"'; DROP TABLE drone_detections; --",
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"' OR '1'='1",
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"1; DELETE FROM devices WHERE 1=1; --",
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"' UNION SELECT * FROM users --"
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];
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for (const payload of injectionPayloads) {
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try {
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// Attempt to use payload in various contexts
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await models.DroneDetection.findAll({
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where: {
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tenant_id: tenant.id,
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// Using parameterized queries should prevent injection
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drone_id: payload
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}
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});
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// The query should execute safely without SQL injection
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// (Sequelize uses parameterized queries by default)
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} catch (error) {
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// If there's an error, it should be a validation error, not a SQL error
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expect(error.name).to.not.include('SQL');
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}
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}
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});
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it('should validate and sanitize detection data', async () => {
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const tenant = await createTestTenant();
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const device = await createTestDevice({
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tenant_id: tenant.id,
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is_approved: true
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});
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const maliciousInputs = [
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{
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name: 'XSS attempt in coordinates',
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data: {
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device_id: device.id,
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geo_lat: '<script>alert("xss")</script>',
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geo_lon: 18.0686,
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device_timestamp: Date.now(),
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drone_type: 2
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}
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},
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{
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name: 'Extremely large coordinates',
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data: {
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device_id: device.id,
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geo_lat: 999999.999999,
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geo_lon: -999999.999999,
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device_timestamp: Date.now(),
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drone_type: 2
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}
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},
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{
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name: 'Invalid data types',
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data: {
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device_id: device.id,
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geo_lat: null,
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geo_lon: undefined,
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device_timestamp: 'invalid_timestamp',
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drone_type: 'invalid_type'
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}
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},
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{
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name: 'Buffer overflow attempt',
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data: {
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device_id: device.id,
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geo_lat: 59.3293,
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geo_lon: 18.0686,
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device_timestamp: Date.now(),
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drone_type: 2,
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additional_data: 'A'.repeat(10000) // Very long string
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}
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}
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];
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for (const test of maliciousInputs) {
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try {
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await models.DroneDetection.create({
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...test.data,
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tenant_id: tenant.id
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});
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// If creation succeeds, verify data was sanitized
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const detection = await models.DroneDetection.findOne({
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where: { device_id: device.id },
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order: [['id', 'DESC']]
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});
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if (detection) {
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// Coordinates should be valid numbers
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if (detection.geo_lat !== null) {
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expect(detection.geo_lat).to.be.a('number');
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expect(detection.geo_lat).to.be.within(-90, 90);
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}
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if (detection.geo_lon !== null) {
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expect(detection.geo_lon).to.be.a('number');
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expect(detection.geo_lon).to.be.within(-180, 180);
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}
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}
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} catch (error) {
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// Expected for invalid data - should be validation error
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expect(error.name).to.be.oneOf(['SequelizeValidationError', 'SequelizeDatabaseError']);
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}
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}
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});
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it('should prevent path traversal attacks', async () => {
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// Test potential file path manipulation
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const pathTraversalPayloads = [
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'../../../etc/passwd',
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'..\\..\\..\\windows\\system32\\config\\sam',
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'/etc/shadow',
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'C:\\Windows\\System32\\drivers\\etc\\hosts',
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'%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2fbootini', // URL encoded
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'....//....//....//etc/passwd'
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];
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pathTraversalPayloads.forEach(payload => {
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// Test file path validation function
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const isValidPath = (path) => {
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// Should reject paths with traversal attempts
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return !path.includes('..') &&
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!path.includes('%2e') &&
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!path.startsWith('/') &&
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!path.match(/^[a-zA-Z]:\\/);
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};
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expect(isValidPath(payload)).to.be.false;
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});
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// Valid paths should pass
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const validPaths = [
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'device_logs.txt',
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'reports/detection_summary.pdf',
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'data/export.csv'
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];
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validPaths.forEach(path => {
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const isValidPath = (path) => {
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return !path.includes('..') &&
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!path.includes('%2e') &&
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!path.startsWith('/') &&
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!path.match(/^[a-zA-Z]:\\/);
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};
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expect(isValidPath(path)).to.be.true;
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});
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});
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});
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describe('Data Protection Security', () => {
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it('should protect sensitive data in database', async () => {
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const tenant = await createTestTenant();
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const user = await createTestUser({
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tenant_id: tenant.id,
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username: 'testuser',
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email: 'test@example.com',
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password: 'SecurePassword123!'
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});
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// Verify password is hashed, not stored in plain text
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expect(user.password_hash).to.exist;
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expect(user.password_hash).to.not.equal('SecurePassword123!');
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expect(user.password_hash.length).to.be.greaterThan(20); // Hashed passwords are longer
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// Verify sensitive fields are not exposed in JSON
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const userJSON = user.toJSON();
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expect(userJSON.password_hash).to.be.undefined; // Should be hidden
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expect(userJSON.username).to.exist; // Public fields should remain
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});
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it('should enforce data retention policies', async () => {
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const tenant = await createTestTenant();
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const device = await createTestDevice({ tenant_id: tenant.id });
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// Create old detections (simulate 1 year old data)
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const oldDetections = [];
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const oneYearAgo = new Date();
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oneYearAgo.setFullYear(oneYearAgo.getFullYear() - 1);
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for (let i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
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oldDetections.push({
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device_id: device.id,
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tenant_id: tenant.id,
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geo_lat: 59.3293,
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geo_lon: 18.0686,
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device_timestamp: oneYearAgo,
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drone_type: 2,
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rssi: -60,
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freq: 2400,
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drone_id: 1000 + i,
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threat_level: 'low',
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createdAt: oneYearAgo,
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updatedAt: oneYearAgo
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});
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}
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await models.DroneDetection.bulkCreate(oldDetections);
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// Create recent detections
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const recentDetections = [];
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for (let i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
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recentDetections.push({
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device_id: device.id,
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tenant_id: tenant.id,
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geo_lat: 59.3293,
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geo_lon: 18.0686,
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device_timestamp: new Date(),
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drone_type: 2,
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rssi: -60,
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freq: 2400,
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drone_id: 2000 + i,
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threat_level: 'medium',
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createdAt: new Date(),
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updatedAt: new Date()
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});
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}
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await models.DroneDetection.bulkCreate(recentDetections);
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// Simulate data retention cleanup (delete data older than 6 months)
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const sixMonthsAgo = new Date();
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sixMonthsAgo.setMonth(sixMonthsAgo.getMonth() - 6);
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const deleteResult = await models.DroneDetection.destroy({
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where: {
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tenant_id: tenant.id,
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createdAt: {
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[models.Sequelize.Op.lt]: sixMonthsAgo
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}
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}
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});
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expect(deleteResult).to.equal(10); // Should delete old records
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// Verify recent data remains
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const remainingDetections = await models.DroneDetection.findAll({
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where: { tenant_id: tenant.id }
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});
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expect(remainingDetections).to.have.length(5);
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});
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it('should anonymize exported data', async () => {
|
|
const tenant = await createTestTenant();
|
|
const user = await createTestUser({ tenant_id: tenant.id });
|
|
const device = await createTestDevice({
|
|
tenant_id: tenant.id,
|
|
geo_lat: 59.3293,
|
|
geo_lon: 18.0686
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const detection = await models.DroneDetection.create({
|
|
device_id: device.id,
|
|
tenant_id: tenant.id,
|
|
geo_lat: 59.3293,
|
|
geo_lon: 18.0686,
|
|
device_timestamp: new Date(),
|
|
drone_type: 2,
|
|
rssi: -60,
|
|
freq: 2400,
|
|
drone_id: 12345,
|
|
threat_level: 'medium'
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
// Function to anonymize data for export
|
|
const anonymizeForExport = (data) => {
|
|
return {
|
|
...data,
|
|
// Remove exact coordinates, use general area
|
|
geo_lat: Math.round(data.geo_lat * 100) / 100, // Reduce precision
|
|
geo_lon: Math.round(data.geo_lon * 100) / 100,
|
|
// Remove device-specific identifiers
|
|
device_id: null,
|
|
// Hash drone ID instead of exposing it
|
|
drone_id_hash: require('crypto').createHash('sha256').update(data.drone_id.toString()).digest('hex').substring(0, 8)
|
|
};
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
const anonymized = anonymizeForExport(detection.toJSON());
|
|
|
|
expect(anonymized.device_id).to.be.null;
|
|
expect(anonymized.drone_id_hash).to.exist;
|
|
expect(anonymized.drone_id_hash).to.not.equal(detection.drone_id);
|
|
expect(anonymized.geo_lat).to.be.lessThan(detection.geo_lat + 0.005); // Reduced precision
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
describe('API Security', () => {
|
|
it('should prevent API abuse and rate limiting bypass', async () => {
|
|
const device = await createTestDevice({ is_approved: true });
|
|
|
|
// Simulate rate limiting for detection endpoint
|
|
const requestCounts = new Map();
|
|
const checkRateLimit = (deviceId, maxPerMinute = 60) => {
|
|
const now = Date.now();
|
|
const windowStart = Math.floor(now / 60000) * 60000; // 1-minute windows
|
|
const key = `${deviceId}-${windowStart}`;
|
|
|
|
const count = requestCounts.get(key) || 0;
|
|
requestCounts.set(key, count + 1);
|
|
|
|
return count < maxPerMinute;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
// Test normal usage - should be allowed
|
|
for (let i = 0; i < 50; i++) {
|
|
expect(checkRateLimit(device.id)).to.be.true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Test excessive usage - should be blocked
|
|
for (let i = 0; i < 20; i++) {
|
|
const allowed = checkRateLimit(device.id);
|
|
if (i < 10) {
|
|
expect(allowed).to.be.true;
|
|
} else {
|
|
expect(allowed).to.be.false;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('should validate API request size limits', async () => {
|
|
const validateRequestSize = (data, maxSizeKB = 100) => {
|
|
const dataSize = JSON.stringify(data).length;
|
|
const maxSizeBytes = maxSizeKB * 1024;
|
|
return dataSize <= maxSizeBytes;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
// Normal request should pass
|
|
const normalRequest = {
|
|
device_id: 123,
|
|
geo_lat: 59.3293,
|
|
geo_lon: 18.0686,
|
|
device_timestamp: Date.now(),
|
|
drone_type: 2
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
expect(validateRequestSize(normalRequest)).to.be.true;
|
|
|
|
// Oversized request should fail
|
|
const oversizedRequest = {
|
|
...normalRequest,
|
|
malicious_payload: 'A'.repeat(200 * 1024) // 200KB of data
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
expect(validateRequestSize(oversizedRequest)).to.be.false;
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('should prevent CSRF attacks', async () => {
|
|
const tenant = await createTestTenant();
|
|
const user = await createTestUser({ tenant_id: tenant.id });
|
|
|
|
// Generate CSRF token
|
|
const generateCSRFToken = (userId, secret = 'csrf-secret') => {
|
|
return require('crypto')
|
|
.createHmac('sha256', secret)
|
|
.update(`${userId}-${Date.now()}`)
|
|
.digest('hex');
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
// Validate CSRF token
|
|
const validateCSRFToken = (token, userId, secret = 'csrf-secret', maxAge = 3600000) => {
|
|
try {
|
|
// In a real implementation, you'd store token metadata
|
|
// This is a simplified validation
|
|
return token && token.length === 64; // Valid format
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
const validToken = generateCSRFToken(user.id);
|
|
expect(validateCSRFToken(validToken, user.id)).to.be.true;
|
|
|
|
// Invalid tokens should fail
|
|
expect(validateCSRFToken('invalid_token', user.id)).to.be.false;
|
|
expect(validateCSRFToken(null, user.id)).to.be.false;
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
});
|